The study is by U. of Chicago economist Casey Mulligan.
US households had the highest COVID-19 transmission rates, a new economic analysis says. Here's why.
Related:
"Economic Lessons From COVID-19". (Always give the points and bet on Hayek.)
"The experts can stay wrong longer than you can stay alive".
"Death and Lockdowns: There’s no proof that lockdowns save lives but plenty of evidence that they end them."
One economist makes an unconditional prediction: "double-digit inflation in the US before the end of this year".
Related: "Inflation: The Ingredients Are in the Pot, and the Fire Is On".
Arnold Kling contributes to the ongoing discussion.
. . . people who are dissatisfied with their lives are likely to blame the social system for their personal unhappiness and join radical movements.
I'd nit-pick and replace "the" with "a," but otherwise I agree 100%.
Noted economist Michael Boskin:
Politicians who seek ever more spending and regulation are banking on the public’s limited ability to wade through the details of massive omnibus bills. In doing so, they tend to pay little regard to the laws of diminishing returns and unintended consequences. But we should remember that the 2008 financial crisis followed a period of serial social engineering by the federal government (through banking mandates, sub-prime mortgage subsidies, and other measures) to promote home ownership.
A partial refutation of one of my posts from last Monday.
Two decades ago, Nobel Prize economist Robert Lucas observed: “What can people be paying Manhattan or downtown Chicago rents for, if not for being near other people?” That statement was true 20 years ago—and, despite Covid-19, it will be true 20 years from now, too. The same fundamentals will continue to drive urban growth.
In case you don't have enough to worry about.
This is simple but terribly important advice:
. . . never let numbers stand alone; always have readily available comparisons that let you answer the crucial questions: is that a lot? What was it last year? Ten years ago?
Michael Barone makes an interesting observation:
How will future historians explain this? From 2001 to 2014, majorities of Americans, including supermajorities of blacks and non-Hispanic whites, told Gallup pollsters that "race relations" were either very or somewhat good.
Then, after the election and reelection of the first American president of African descent, each case with majorities of the popular vote and electoral votes, perceptions suddenly plunged.
One possible explanation: a well-known observation (originally from de Tocqueville) is that revolutions tend not to start when conditions are absolutely bad, but when conditions are actually improving significantly but less rapidly than the middle class hopes for. O. was supposed to be this lightworker, this enormous change, but stuff was pretty much the same. Hence, despite much lower absolute levels of racism, misogyny, etc. etc. now compared with the past, frustration and anger.
Let's hope so:
The backlash to critical race theory, gender ideology and what is often called "wokeness" in schools represents a rare example of bipartisan agreement during a hyper-polarized time. The backlash to critical race theory, gender ideology and what is often called "wokeness" in schools represents a rare example of bipartisan agreement during a hyper-polarized time.